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Agricultural marketing
Kay Muir-Leresche and Chiedza Muchopa
Zimbabwe has had a wide range of experience with different types of market­
ing systems, ranging from state-controlled to free market systems. Given that 
Zimbabwe is an agro-based economy, the development of an efficient market­
ing system is key to sustainable agricultural growth and economic develop­
ment. Like any other developing country, Zimbabwe followed the develop­
ment process regarding agricultural commodity marketing systems, starting 
with state control then moving to a free market system from the 1930s to late 
1990s. State interventions during the 1990s were to regulate and facilitate the 
development of markets as well as protect against unfair commodity pricing 
systems. The land and agrarian reforms beginning in 1999 and the food crisis 
during the same period ushered back state control and interventions in the mar­
keting of agricultural commodities. Some of the structural and institutional 
developments in the sector from 1999 appear to have been planned but other 
fundamental changes were made on an ad-hoc basis. This chapter discusses the 
marketing of agricultural commodities from the pre-independence era to the 
situation in 2005. The chapter then critically examines the current status of 
marketing of major agriculture commodities.
Evolution of agricultural marketing
Government intervened in marketing during the depression of the 1930s to 
keep white farmers on the land. Most of the interventions at policy and practi­
cal levels were biased in favour of small-scale white farmers. Producer prices 
were subsidized initially by consumers who paid prices above import parity 
and by the communal farmers and large-scale farmers who sold at low export 
prices. The direct price discrimination was discontinued after the Second World 
War but communal farmers continued to be disadvantaged by the location of 
marketing depots and by licensed agents who took advantage of their monopoly 
position.
This restrictive marketing system which prevented competition and en­
couraged unidirectional trade was one of the principal causes of low rates of 
economic growth in communal areas. It created barriers to entry and discour­
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aged the emergence of rural markets and private traders. The expansion of 
infrastructure and social services after independence improved living condi­
tions in rural areas. However, the highly centralized marketing and control con­
tinued in the 1980s reducing opportunities for further rural growth and indus­
trialization. Price and input incentives increased agricultural output after inde­
pendence but the rural areas remained undeveloped. At independence, less than 
5 per cent of marketed output came from communal farmers. But with the 
provision of input packs and the higher maize prices, smallholder maize pro­
duction doubled over the 1979-85 period. Most of the increase came from a 
minority (10 per cent) of smallholders in natural regions II and III.
The origin and development of the state agricultural marketing systems 
prior to liberalization are outlined in table 13.1. A common feature in many 
countries was that most of the agricultural commodities were controlled by 
state-owned boards with de jure monopoly controls and, in the case of Zimba­
bwe, these were also de facto. There was little black market trading either in­
ternally or by cross-border trading. The state marketing system was strictly 
controlled and efficient -  it always purchased surpluses and it always provided 
sufficient maize to urban consumers. In Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya and other 
countries, the state marketing systems sometimes failed to purchase or pay for 
the surplus in years of plenty and failed to make grain available for consumers 
in deficit years.
Although technically efficient, the state marketing system was economi­
cally highly inefficient and regressive, thus having negative effects on both 
growth and equity. These inefficiencies were brought about by monopoly power 
and pricing inefficiencies, bureaucratic procedures and the restrictions on trade 
between communities in different areas. Jayne, Chisvo and Rukuni (1999) es­
timated that the marketing controls implicitly taxed the poorest rural people 
some 20-30 per cent of potential producer prices in most years. The impacts of 
these distorting effects are highlighted in the section on producer prices.
Agricultural marketing parastatals incurred heavy losses in the 1980s as a 
result of the expansion of the system to serve a large number of widely-dis­
persed smallholders. These losses were exacerbated by the subsidies which 
predominantly favoured consumers and, in some cases, large-scale farmers 
(Muir-Leresche, 1998). Table 13.1 shows that most of the subsidies paid to the 
marketing boards accrued to large-scale farmers or urban consumers and were 
therefore regressive. Despite the objectives of promoting growth and equity, 
the policies were inimical to both.
'55See Muir (1983), Muir-Leresche (1998) and Takavarasha (1994) for more details on agri­
cultural marketing.
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Table 13.1 Agricultural marketing boards prior to liberalization
Authority Role and responsibilities
ijfojthority (1967) 
l^jtscontinued
Grain Marketing 
Board (1931) 
(Full control and 
monopoly on all 
internal and 
external grain 
trading 
reintroduced 
2001)
Coordinated and arranged financing for the commodity boards. The Agriculture 
Marketing Authority was dissolved in 1994 and discussions of reviving it started 
in 2003.
Controlled: maize (1931), sorghum (1950), groundnuts (1952), soyabeans 
(1969), wheat (1970), coffee (1972), sunflowers (1984), bulrush millet (mhunga) 
and finger millet (rapoko) (1950-60 and 1984). All decontrolled 1991-1994 
except Grain Marketing Board which remained a residual trading board for the 
purchase, grading, handling, transport, storage, disposal and all exports and 
imports of maize and wheat.
Until 1993 there was total monopoly on purchase, sale and exports. Limited 
trading of maize within specified zones was allowed but not across zones. 
Although legally allowed to sell maize grain from depots, in practice no grain 
was sold locally until the late 1980s. Some 60 per cent of the value of all maize 
purchases in the 1980s came from communal fanners. Direct government 
subsidies to the Grain Marketing Board averaged Z$43.2 million per annum 
between 1980 and 1989. In years of surplus Grain Marketing Board subsidies 
were directed towards producers (surpluses exported at a loss). In all other years 
producer prices were below parity and subsidies benefited mainly urban 
consumers or sustained marketing inefficiencies.
P o ld  Storage 
jptm mission 
jfl93R)
gmichanged 2000)
Primarily responsible for the purchase, slaughter and distribution of cattle and 
external trading. Transport costs were refunded to large-scale beef formers. It 
was also a tesidual buyer for sheep and goats. The comnusskm was bistMicaHy 
important in developing poultry and pig industries which. wes$ d£C(Mtralied once 
established (Pilborough in Muir; 1983). The commission also play ed an 
important role in cattle finance, drought relief and state cattle ranthing. Only 5 
per cent of purchases were from communal land farmers. Direct government 
subsidies to the Cold Storage Commission included consimsCrsubstdies and 
losses on cattle finance and drought relief schemes. Subsidies averaged Z$47 
million per annum between 1982 and 1989. Effective monopoly because of 
health restrictions on urban sales from other sources. Reduced enforcement and 
effective competition in urban areas from private abattoirs after access to 
imported equipment after 1994. Legal control of all external trade remains.
Dairy Marketing 
Board (1952) 
(Dairi board 
Zimbabwe (Pvt) 
Limited, 1996)
De jure but after 1991 only de facto monopoly trading board in the purchase, 
processing, distribution and external trade of all dairy products. About 1 per cent 
of the value of all purchases from communal farmers. Direct government 
subsidies to the board included consumer subsidies and averaged Z$34 million 
per annum between 1980 and 1990. Commercialized in 1993 and started making 
profits -  effective monopoly despite some small dairy competition.
Bfctton MarketingfcSSSLi Monopoly trading board in the purchase, processing and export of all cotton products until after economic structural adjustment programme. The board required to fulfil local textile manufacturers requirements at set prices before 
i exporting to best advantage. Well over 50 per cent o f die value o f all purchases 
were from smallholders. In most years producers were paid less than export 
value, thus subsidizing manufacturers and reducing deficit which averaged
P ;  v. Z$5.2 miHion per annum between 1980 and 1989. Commercialized in 1994 and some competition allowed.
Tobacco
Marketing Board 
(1936) TIMB 
(1997)
De jure powers to determine where all tobacco is sold, including the amounts 
sold by any one farmer. The tobacco is sold on farmer-owned auction floors 
where bidding is open to all licensed buyers.
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P roducer price policy
Before 1970, producer prices were set at levels aimed at protecting producers, 
although there were a few years when they were set in favour of consumers.156 
During the 1970s prices to urban consumers were subsidized in a bid to keep 
down wages and to buy political favour. In this period, groundnut and cotton 
farmers tended to be taxed whereas wheat farmers were heavily subsidized in 
order to achieve self-sufficiency. Maize prices declined along with maize out­
put throughout the 1970s.
Producer prices were set on a cost of production basis negotiated annually 
between the Commercial Farmers’ Union and the government. This encour­
aged a bias towards high-cost, high-yield technologies. In addition, the pro­
ducer price policies prior to independence subsidized the capital-intensive com­
modities produced by large-scale farmers and tended to tax smallholder crops 
such as groundnuts and cotton. The system was continued after independence, 
with smallholder representatives being included in the annual price negotiation 
with the government. However, increasingly throughout the 1980s, producer 
prices were influenced by the state marketing board deficits which, in turn, 
were influenced by the cost of establishing depots and collection points in un­
economic areas and by the low controlled selling prices.
Producer and controlled retail selling prices were set uniformly throughout 
the country (pan-territorial) and throughout the year (pan-seasonal). Farmers 
with access to the Grain Marketing Board markets were, therefore, discour­
aged from maintaining on-farm storage. This increased the burden on state 
marketing boards and negatively affected growth and equity since those able to 
sell early in the season (large-scale farmers) benefited. However, smallholder 
farmers lacked access to drying facilities and reliable transport, making it risky 
to sell grain to the board at harvest and rely on repurchasing grain later in the 
year. The pan-territorial prices also encouraged the production of maize in re­
mote, surplus areas rather than in deficit areas. They provided higher incomes 
to farmers in high rainfall areas and lower incomes to low-rainfall areas where 
yields were low (Muir and Takavarasha, 1988).
Real prices for commodities declined during the 1980s. Although real 
producer prices of all commodities declined, there was an increase in the pro­
duction of export commodities responding to export incentives.
In the processing and agro-industrial sectors, the price, exchange rate and
]57See Muir-Leresche (1985) for an analysis of price policy prior to independence.
The Grain Marketing Board selling price was controlled by the Ministry of Trade and 
i5gCommerce for the benefit of consumers.
Net protection coefficients all indicate producer taxes and declining real prices (Jansen 
and Muir, 1994).
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regulatory policies of the 1980s reflected the influence of the small but power­
ful industrial lobby and favoured capital-intensive technologies and the formal 
sector. There was only a very small informal sector and limited local competi­
tion because of the restricted access to imports. The policies did not encourage 
competition and discriminated against new entrants, reducing the opportuni­
ties for achieving both growth and equity.
M arket liberalization in the 1990s
Although the national policy documents were vague about decontrolling mar­
kets, agricultural market decontrol was one of the first areas to be addressed as 
part of the economic structural adjustment programme. In February 1991, par­
liamentary changes to the marketing board constitutions gave the boards greater 
autonomy in pricing and business decisions and by August 1991, independent
Table 13.2 Zimbabwe: real producer prices 1985/86-1990/91 at constant 
2000 pricesd
Year
85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92
White maize 
($/tonne)
5,106 3,877 3,620 3,515 3,388 2,871 2,424
Soyabeans
($/tonne)
9,078 7,322 7,744 7,571 6,855 6,189 5,028
Sunflower seed 
($/tonne)
9,078 7,322 7,844 7,751 7,170 6,444 5,208
S/groundnuts
($/tonne)
21,276 16,152 18,102 18,025 15,758 15,951 11,224
Wheat
($/tonne)
8,085 6,461 6,638 6,579 6,303 5,870 4,669
Seed cotton 
(c/kg)
1,901 1,615 1,609 1,532 1,466 1,493 1,266
Beef
(c/kg)
4,340 3,877 4,747 4,524 4,302 3,879 3,313
Dairy
(c/1)
1,160 877 821 824 797 671 575
Tobacco 
(flue-cured) c/kg
8,902 4,693 7,914 7,746 10,220 14,768 7,276
J Deflated by consumer price index (2000=100) from CSO (2001), prices are based on 
official sources -  Grain Marketing Board, Cottco, Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited, floor 
prices or ZIMACE bid/offer price.
Sources: Agricultural Finance Corporation (1998), Commercial Farmers’ Union 
indicative prices, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (2000)
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boards of directors were established. In May 1991, two commercial dairy co­
operatives were given permission to market milk products and compete with 
the Dairy Marketing Board. In August, sorghum and millets were decontrolled, 
becoming regulated crops for which the Grain Marketing Board would set floor 
prices and remain a residual buyer. In September, private coffee marketing was 
permitted in cooperation with the Grain Marketing Board. Cotton and ground­
nut farmers received supplementary payments so that final prices approximated 
export parity. Yellow maize had been partially decontrolled in 1990, with farm­
ers free to sell to any domestic buyer. However, in 1991 farmers were threat­
ened with the recontrol of yellow maize if they continued the switch from the 
controlled white maize to the uncontrolled yellow maize. The Grain Marketing 
Board announced plans to close more than twenty uneconomic depots but few 
closures were enacted at the time.
Table 13.3 Real producer prices of various agricultural commodities 1990/91-1999/00 
at constant 2000 prices
Year
90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00”
White maize 
($/tonne)
2,871 2,424 3,872 5,179 4,226 4,642 3,905 5,188 3,741 4,600
Soyabeans
($/tonne)
6,189 5,028 6,688 8,632 7,044 10,444 9,828 9,140 8,105 8,300
Sunflower 
seed ($/tonne)
6,444 5,208 7,005 8,471 6,913 7,736 6,509 3,582 5,923 7.000
S/Groundnuts
($/tonne)
15,951 11,224 10,561 10,359 11,270 23,209 20,177 15,316 10,131 13,500
Wheat
($/tonne)
5,870 4,669 7,005 8,345 6,809 10,444 8,299 6,299 5,923 6,835
Seed cotton 
(c/kg)
1,493 1,266 2,119 1,842 1,738 1,625 1,953 2,594 1,637 1,400
Beef
(c/kg)
3,879 3,313 2,598 2,653 6,189 6,642 6,052 4,364 4,500
Dairy
(c/1)
671 575 507 622 743 775 716 770 780
Tobacco (flue- 
cured) c/kg
14,768 7,276 5,651 7,944 8,470 11,222 9,440 8,582 10,323 8,131
bNote: deflated by consumer price index (2000=100) from CSO (2001), prices are based on official 
sources -  Grain Marketing Board, Cottco, Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited, floor prices or ZIMACE 
bid/offer price
Sources: Agricultural Finance Corporation (1998), Commercial Farmers’ Union indicative prices, 
Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (2000)
Agricultural marketing
Agricultural output grew during the early 1990s and then declined. The 
post-reform period reduced the implicit taxes of the 1980s but there were other 
distortions and regulations that discouraged new business and competition. The 
adjusted nominal protection coefficients for agricultural commodity exports in 
the 1980s averaged around 0.6 whereas in the 1990s they remained closer to 1, 
except for tobacco which varied between 0.8 and 0.9, depending on assump­
tions (Muir-Leresche, 1998).
M aize m arketing
Maize is Zimbabwe’s staple food, accounting for over 50 per cent of the aver­
age calorie consumption. During the colonial era, the Grain Marketing Board 
effectively serviced only the large-scale commercial sector. The communal sector 
was also proscribed from marketing freely yet the farmers had difficulty ac­
cessing the Grain Marketing Board except through designated agents who ob­
tained monopoly rents. In 1980, the new Zimbabwean government extended 
the support services long enjoyed by the commercial settlers to the rural farm­
ing sector. The Grain Marketing Board expanded into rural areas by opening 
up an extensive network of grain silos, collection points and feeder depots 
throughout the rural areas.
The extension of marketing and agricultural support services to rural farm­
ers resulted in rapid growth in production of maize and other grains creating a 
record surplus of maize and small grain which increased the marketed output. 
Smallholder farmers increased production and accounted for over 60 per cent 
of the marketed maize and 100 per cent of small grains handled by the Grain 
Marketing Board. The board was responsible for collecting grain from collec­
tion points in all the rural depots and transported it to centralized storage silos 
for sale to millers. The maize producer prices were pan-territorial and pan- 
seasonal. Given that the millers were located in the major urban centres the 
milled products had to be transported back to the rural areas.
In the 1980s, maize meal was subsidized for political and social reasons. 
Part of the subsidy was paid to the Grain Marketing Board to balance their 
trading account (selling price to millers being held below cost) and the balance 
of the subsidy was paid directly to the four major milling companies. Despite 
the monopoly role of the Grain Marketing Board and the legislation that pro­
hibited cross-district trading, some rural hammer millers were operating in 
communal areas. These subsidies resulted in the closure of an estimated 200 
rural mills as farmers sold their maize to the Grain Marketing Board and bought 
the subsidized maize meal from the urban centres. The subsidies were esti­
mated at 60 per cent of retail roller meal (straight run maize meal) price whereas 
the local hammer-mill price would be only 5 per cent higher than the controlled
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159price (Child, Muir and Blackie, 1985). The maize meal subsidy was rational­
ized on the basis of equity, despite its very high costs. The more remote areas 
did not receive access to the subsidized maize meal. Since the majority of Zim­
babwe’s poor live in these areas, the maize meal subsidy did not address equity. 
The distortions from the marketing controls and from the maize subsidy re­
duced opportunities for small rural traders and urban millers to participate in 
the market. These distortions led to increasingly large subsidies to the Grain 
Marketing Board.
Expansion of Grain Marketing Board monopoly marketing infrastructure 
to the rural areas increased operational costs for the parastatals. The policy of 
offering incentive producer prices to stimulate production and much lower con­
sumer prices to promote household food security left the Grain Marketing Board 
with a huge deficit in its annual trading account and this became increasingly 
burdensome in the late 1980s. During the same period, the domestic macro- 
economic situation was rapidly deteriorating due to national fiscal deficits and 
declining economic growth. The government defaulted on Grain Marketing 
Board debt and the parastatals had to reduce administrative and transport costs 
to a minimum. These economic realities persuaded government to adopt the 
economic structural adjustment programme that saw the liberalization of agri­
cultural markets in 1991.
The decontrol of the white maize market in 1992 was controversial. It started 
when the government allowed maize to be moved between contiguous com­
munal areas. By February 1992, free movement of maize was allowed in the 
arid regions (natural regions IV and V), the Grain Marketing Board remaining 
a residual buyer at a set floor price. At the same time the movement of maize 
between non-contiguous communal areas was also permitted. One of the most 
far-reaching effects of the restructuring of the markets occurred in 1992 with 
the removal of the subsidy on refined maize meal. This subsidy had only been 
available to large-scale millers and the industry was concentrated in the hands 
of three companies, namely, National Foods, Blue Ribbon Foods and Victoria 
Milling Company, including two linked to multinationals (Rubey, 1995). Lift­
ing the subsidy and allowing smallholders direct access to urban markets re­
sulted in a rapid expansion in the number of small milling companies. By 1993, 
prices and domestic markets were decontrolled for all commodities except maize 
and wheat. Licences had to be obtained for external trade in most commodities. 159
159There are three types of maize meal consumed in Zimbabwe:
a) Hammer meal is straight-run ground maize without any components removed, usually con­
sumed in rural and low income urban areas;
b) Roller meal found in urban areas has a few components such as husks removed in the milling 
process. This is meant for mass markets and is cheaper than refined mealie meal
c) Refined or super refined maize meal has some components removed and processed. Is less 
nutritious but popular with the urban elite.
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Maize marketing and prices were fully decontrolled on the domestic mar­
ket by 1996 although the Grain Marketing Board remained the sole importer 
and exporter of maize (granting licences for trade on its behalf). The Grain 
Marketing Board was mandated to set prices to operate as floor and ceiling 
prices to stabilize prices and was also required to hold national strategic grain 
reserves and to provide services to disadvantaged rural communities. Maize 
trading throughout the country was freed and all subsidies removed.
The marketing reforms performed better than even the most ardent free 
market advocates had anticipated. The market no longer operated along a sin­
gle channel between major cities and the rest of the country. As the marketing 
of major commodities opened up, traders became established and marketing of 
other commodities and opportunities for local industrialization, trade and ex­
change widened. The decontrols were also effective because they were ac­
companied by the lifting of restrictions on foreign currency and imports, thus 
allowing for purchase of transport, processing equipment and other inputs by 
new entrants. Rural entrepreneurs were able to take advantage of the invest­
ment made in infrastructure development in the previous decade. However, 
producers, local processors and rural traders continued to be hampered by 
the high tariffs on vehicles, taxes on fuels, unwieldy regulations and poor tel­
ecommunications. Anecdotal evidence indicates that in those areas with net­
work access, cellphone communication had increased market efficiency and 
resulted in some cross-country trading as a result of better access to informa­
tion.
The multiplier and dynamic effects of maize market liberalization appear 
to have been considerable as rural trading and processing expanded and com­
munal area farmers became more active in commercialized agriculture towards 
the end of the century. The informal sector throughout the country grew sig­
nificantly in the 1990s.
Im pact of liberalization on producers, processors and traders 
After price and marketing decontrol, small traders and multinational corpora­
tions began to offer marketing services to fanners. The first year of private 
trading, following the good 1994 harvest, resulted in producers being paid less 
than the Grain Marketing Board price by private traders in communal areas 
(ZFU Marketing Survey, 1996). However, the main advantages to producers of 
using private traders were instant payment, farm-gate collection, packaging 
and grading services; thus fanners preferred to use private traders even at dis­
counted prices. The 1995 harvest was poor and the prices paid to producers by *
There was a marked increase in the sale of traditional foods in urban areas.
There was an increase of 115 per cent in the number of hammer millers between 1992 and 
1995, the surplus grain areas having the strongest response (Zimbabwe national hammer 
miller status study, USAID, 1996).
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private traders were more than double those paid by Grain Marketing Board by 
early 1996. Despite very good rains and large supplies, the prices did not drop 
the following year. The reduced inefficiencies in the maize market system ap­
peared to offset the supply effect on price in the new free market system.
Cotton farmers benefited from the intense competition between three large 
traders (Cottco, Cargill and Cotpro) to purchase the cotton crop and prices rose 
despite relatively low international prices. As most of the cotton farmers are 
smallholders, the decontrol had positive impacts on both growth and equity. 
There were also beneficial effects for groundnut and other farmers with the 
expansion of local processing facilities. The activities of traders in the area and 
increased transport resulted in increases in horticultural sales and in the more 
widespread marketing of wild fruits, insects and small mammals.
Efforts to commercialize the Grain Marketing Board highlighted the con­
flicts between having to be profitable, holding buffer stocks and stabilizing 
prices. Most farmers benefited from the Grain Marketing Board’s continued 
provision of a safety-net as a buyer of last resort and at the same time took 
advantage of a more open trading environment. The producers negatively af­
fected by decontrol and commercialization were small, surplus farmers in re­
mote areas where the Grain Marketing Board depots had closed down. These 
areas had high transport and transaction costs with a few scattered farmers 
producing small surpluses. Until the infrastructure is improved and larger, more 
consistent supplies of commodities and higher-value outputs are produced, it is 
likely that these areas will remain undeveloped. In the poor, rainfall-deficit 
areas producers benefited from the opening of markets and even the closure of 
depots since they could now legally take advantage of the high demand for 
grain in those areas.
The most remarkable result of decontrol was the significant increase in 
rural and urban small-scale millers, the increase in the number of rural traders 
and the opportunities for growth with equity as the multiplier effects and op­
tions for local specialization and exchange expanded. The supply response was 
almost immediate and occurred despite the high interest rates which particu­
larly affected new enterprises, the stringent health regulations and the many 
other bureaucratic and financial problems facing their entry. Barriers to entry 
for rural traders were significantly reduced by the lack of any licensing re­
quirements thus allowing the market to be more competitive than in those coun- 162
162There are over 23 stipulated requirements to meet urban health regulations. These are 
broadly applied to all food processing and many of the requirements are unnecessary. 
Their existence, however, makes investors vulnerable to arbitrary closure by politicians 
and bureaucrats with other agendas. Regulations may even be inappropriate to large in­
dustrial manufacturers. They were introduced during the era when prices were controlled 
and based on costs of production so that their costs were borne by consumers or govern­
ment subsidies and attracted no objections from the industrialists.
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tries where traders had to be licensed. There is need for some lobbying for 
licensing, however, to reduce operations of unscrupulous traders and to raise 
local district revenues but experience elsewhere indicates that the transaction 
costs imposed by a licensing system would outweigh any benefits from the 
controls.
Impact on consumers
The removal of subsidies, particularly on maize meal (roller meal), was ex­
pected to have negative income effects for the poor -  certainly in the short 
term. But the less refined products were produced at prices similar to those of 
the previously subsidized, refined, industrially-milled, roller meal (Rubey, 1995). 
It was estimated that in January 1992, only 5 per cent of urban consumers 
purchased some straight-run meal but surveys indicate this had climbed to over 
80 per cent of the urban population by 2000.
Despite the lifting of subsidies, real selling prices of maize were slightly 
lower than they had been before the reforms. Although the nominal price of 
roller meal increased substantially, the option to purchase grain reduced basic 
food costs by making cheaper hammer-milled maize available (Muir, 1998^. 
Poor consumers benefited from the decontrol both nutritionally and financially. 
The increased availability of hammer-milled meal at 60-75 per cent the cost of 
roller meal helped offset the adverse effects of liberalization on consumers.
*  164However, large-scale millers continued to access the lower cost Grain Mar­
keting Board held stocks while the small-scale milling sector did not have ac­
cess to these supplies, forcing them to source higher priced grain from the 
market. After the food riots in 1998, the large-scale millers were again given an 
unfair advantage as the Grain Marketing Board retailed maize grain at lower 
prices to a few selected registered millers to try to limit the extent to which the 
millers raised roller meal prices to consumers.
The inability of the Grain Marketing Board’s pricing structure to adjust to 
prevailing market conditions resulted in serious problems. Inefficiencies were 
created as those who could access the cheaper Grain Marketing Board supplies 
were able to amass benefits at the expense of the hammer millers, traders and 
consumers who relied on the open market for maize supplies. The system did 
not necessarily reward the most efficient actors in the marketing system. Maize 
meal prices soared as a result of these inefficiencies and the government re­
introduced price controls on roller meal in 1999. This policy however could 163
163The hammer-milled maize contains more vitamins and nutrients although it is often less 
i64preferred in low-density urban suburbs as it involves an investment of time. 
imThere are three major large-scale millers, National Foods being the largest.
In 1998 Grain Marketing Board increased nominal selling prices of grain by 30 per cent to 
Z$2,900. Grain Marketing Board continued to pay farmers Z$1200 and increased the 
price in response to the imports needed to increase stocks.
not be administered effectively with the bulk of maize being processed by the 
informal sector. Furthermore the reintroduction of subsidies on industrial roller 
meal in 1999 following the food riots, weakened the small-scale milling sector 
(Jayne et al., 1999; McKay, 2001). Rural consumers benefited more than urban 
consumers from decontrol when comparing the costs of roller meal with lo­
cally processed meal (Stack, 1997). This was to be expected as the transport 
and transactions costs savings were greater. In addition, the informal market 
responded more strongly to supply, giving better price signals than the formal 
market. The rural poor did not benefit from subsidies because of limited access 
and, even with access, the subsidized meal was more expensive than their own 
produce. A large proportion of the subsidy goes to the rich, to pet food and 
other leakages. In addition the nutritional benefits from wider consumption of 
the less refined maize meal are important.
Liberalization also benefited consumers indirectly through the dynamic 
effects of the establishment of small millers and processors which provide a 
focal point for the exchange of other commodities. In addition the increased 
competition forced industrial millers to become more efficient, reducing real 
prices but with some costs to formal sector employment. This was largely off­
set by those employed in the small milling sector, although at lower wages.
The role of government in agricultural marketing
The drought of 1991/92 eliminated the plan to reduce agricultural subsidies. It 
was the worst drought ever experienced in the country and came after almost a 
decade of below average rainfall so that both the surface and underground wa­
ter supplies were also low and most families did not have any stocks of food. 
The government responded by introducing a large supplementary feeding pro­
gramme. Another drought in 1994/95 also affected the subsidy position. In 
general, all subsidies to agricultural parastatals that made losses were reduced 
(except the drought-related Grain Marketing Board losses) significantly and 
some parastatals even made profits. The state was expected to ensure constant 
access at reasonable prices to the basic staple, maize, and had invested in infra­
structure and physical and financial strategic reserves in most years. However, 
financial constraints contributed to the low producer prices in 1997 and the 
inability of Grain Marketing Board to compete with private traders and to re­
plenish buffer stocks. This in turn contributed to the 1998 food riots and the 
reintroduction of controls and subsidies. The escalation of the Grain Marketing 
Board debt to Z$10 billion resulted in pressures to hold down producer prices. 
Institutional factors related to threats of land redistribution with designation of 
1,471 large-scale commercial farms further reduced maize supply and resulted 
in a severe food deficit. The compulsory acquisition in the first five years of the 
new millennium saw a rapid decline in food crops and created intense food 
insecurity.
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The Grain Marketing Board was not effective in fulfilling its social roles 
because of inadequate or late financing and was not able to compete with the 
private sector for access to maize supplies, particularly in deficit years. All 
domestic maize trading was banned in late 2001 and all maize grain could be 
sold only to the Grain Marketing Board. This applied to every trader. The Grain 
Marketing Board then serviced only selected millers, threatening the survival 
of the urban and rural food processors, leaving them to source grain illegally 
and operate with no security. To the extent that these regulations were not en­
forceable in the more remote areas, it may encourage increased investment in 
rural hammer mills, particularly if maize meal sales remain unsubsidized and 
uncontrolled.
Early in 2002, the holding of all grain stocks by farmers was banned and 
grain supplies were seized, leaving the livestock industry and farmworkers facing 
disaster. Even some smallholder farmers had grain stocks seized and all exist­
ing grain contracts were cancelled. The dislocation, controls and subsidies af­
fected downstream industries, consumers and farmers, and had severe negative 
impacts on rural development.
Cotton marketing
Prior to reforms, government controlled cotton marketing through the Cotton 
Marketing Board. The price of cotton was established on the basis that the local 
textile industry166 had all their needs met at a predetermined price that was nor­
mally significantly below prices which would have been obtained from export­
ing cotton lint. Cotton seed was sold below export parity to the local oil process­
ing industry. These pricing policies affected growth by reallocating resources 
away from cotton production and were also regressive. Smallholders accounted 
for over 50 per cent of total cotton production in most years and they were 
effectively subsidizing industrialists.
The Cotton Marketing Board was granted formal managerial autonomy in 
1991. In the period 1993 to 1994 the board’s statutory monopoly in purchasing, 
ginning, marketing and exporting of cotton was removed. The Cotton Com­
pany of Zimbabwe (Cottco) was launched in 1994 to replace the Cotton Mar­
keting Board. Cottco was privatized in October 1997 and was listed on the 
Zimbabwe stock exchange where it has been very successful. Once the cotton 
sector was opened up to competition, new competitors began entering the mar­
ket in the period 1995-1996. Cargill, a United States of America based multi­
national company, entered the market and introduced the cash payment sys­
tem. Smallholder farmers welcomed the cash payment system as this assured
166The textile industry was dominated by two companies, David Whitehead and Cone Tex­
tiles.
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Table 13.4 Grade A cotton prices (Z$/kg seed cotton)
Harvest
year Cottco
Name of company 
Cotpro Cargill
1994 3.89 Unavailable Not yet in operation
1995 4.30 4.83 5.00
1996 5.81 6.25 5.70
1997 6.00 6.32 6.00
1998 9.37 9.35 8.02
1999 14.50 14.75 15.00
Sources: Larsen (2001); Cotton Growers’Association
immediate access to cash as opposed to the Cotton Marketing Board system 
where producers received a cheque payment two to four weeks after delivery 
of the cotton. The Cotton Producers Association (Cotpro) Limited, a coopera­
tive representing large-scale commercial cotton producers, was the other major 
competitor to enter the market. A few other small Zimbabwean traders also 
entered the market as mobile buyers. The three major companies organized 
their own buying posts and collection points staffed with their own employees 
so that they did not rely on commissioned agents or independent buyers. The 
competition between the three companies also led them to supply credit and 
inputs which were tied to sales. Before the reform of the cotton sector, pro­
ducer prices of cotton were 58 per cent of the international price from 1990 to 
1993. Following the decision to open up the cotton sector to greater competi­
tion, the ratio of domestic to international prices of cotton rose by more than a 
third. For the period 1994 to 1997 the ratio of domestic to international prices 
was 79 per cent (World Bank, 1999). Following the reforms in the cotton sec­
tor, production increased and farmers have been receiving between 80 and 90 
per cent of world prices. The emergence of private traders, exporters and ginners 
gave new dynamism to the rural sector (World Bank, 2000). A review of the 
seed cotton prices from 1994 to 1999 shows that Cotpro and Cottco offered 
similar prices, with Cottco acting as the price leader. Cottco and Cotpro adopted 
price-setting policies based on the seasonal pool pricing system whereby farm­
ers actually received payments twice a year. However, Cotpro and Cargill pric­
ing depended on Cottco’s prices. Cottco continues to play the role of price 
leader in the market thus limiting effective competition in the industry. Table
The seasonal pool pricing system is an option whereby fanners are paid an interim price 
on delivery of their cotton and at the end of the season an adjustment is made. This pro­
vides farmers with the opportunity to benefit from international price movements but 
incurs more risk.
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13.4 shows the price indices for seed cotton after cotton trade was liberalized.
Cotpro limited was taken over by Cottco in 2000 due to financial difficul­
ties and was wholly owned by Cottco by 2005. Cottco accounted for 80 to 85 
per cent of the market in 2000 and now maintains monopoly power.
Dairy marketing
The Dairy Marketing Board was commercialized in 1993 and then fully priva­
tized as Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited in 1996. The government removed price 
controls and allowed the entry of private companies and cooperatives into the 
milk industry, such as Quality Dairies in Marondera, Masvingo Coop, 
Kershelmar Dairies in Bulawayo and multinational companies such as Nestle 
Zimbabwe (Private) Limited. Some price and non-price competition and a wider 
range of dairy products resulted. Barriers to entry were high and were particu­
larly formidable for small dairies which were severely hampered by strict health 
regulations and the high cost of the sophisticated processing and storage equip­
ment required.
The Dairy Marketing Board responded to commercialization by reducing 
staff, leasing commercially unviable depots in urban and rural areas, privatiz­
ing the milk rounds, upgrading the transport fleet, tightening budget controls 
and increasing milk prices. Significant losses were transformed into profits 
within a year. This was the result of the increased efficiencies but also increased 
consumer prices for these relatively price inelastic commodities as well as lim­
ited competition. Because of droughts in the early 1990s and the rising costs of 
stockfeeds, farmers reduced milk production despite increased producer prices.
In 2000 Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited purchased 85 per cent of the na­
tional milk deliveries. Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited significantly benefited 
from exports to Malawi and Kenya. Nestle purchased 8.5 per cent and the re­
maining share went to a few small processors. The rural dairy industry has not 
been able to attract many entrants due to the poor viability of smallholder dairy­
ing (Hanyani-Mlambo etal., 1998; Makamure et al., 2001).
Livestock and beef marketing
The Cold Storage Commission was established in 1937 to control the beef 
industry and its mandate evolved over the years. According to the Cold Storage 
Commission Act, the commission was given the mandate to purchase all live­
stock delivered by any person, operate abattoirs and refrigeration works for the 
purpose of chilling, freezing and storing beef, mutton, pork, poultry, fish and 
any other perishable foodstuffs of whatever nature, and operate canning facto­
ries and works for manufacturing glue, blood meal and other byproducts of the 
carcasses of livestock.
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From 1991, beef marketing on the domestic market was liberalized and 
private abattoirs were allowed to operate provided they were licensed, inspected 
and conformed to hygiene standards and regulations. The liberalization of the 
beef industry induced a proliferation of private slaughterhouses of which 54 
were registered private abattoirs (Makamure et al., 2001). The Cold Storage 
Commission (now the Cold Storage Company) experienced declining through­
put. In 1990 the Cold Storage Commission contributed 52 per cent of the total 
cattle slaughter but this declined to 22 per cent by 1999. Activities by regis­
tered and unregistered abattoirs increased over the same period. The Cold Stor­
age Commission has a monopoly on international beef markets although li­
cences were also granted to meat processors to export. Exports to Europe under 
the Lome Conventions had contributed significantly to the value of the beef 
industry and disruptions to the flow of exports have reduced Cold Storage 
Commission profitability and resulted in potential foreclosure of some of its 
operations.
Tobacco marketing
The tobacco industry has been largely free from interventions and prices re­
flect world price trends less the export tax. All tobacco must be sold on the 
licensed auction floors and no private arrangements can be made. At the auc­
tion floors local and international tobacco buying companies bid for each bale 
of tobacco sold. The Tobacco Industry Marketing Board168 *70 is the government 
body regulating tobacco marketing in Zimbabwe. The Tobacco Sales Floor 171 
and Burley Marketing Zimbabwe have dominated the industry for years. Boka 
Tobacco Auction Floors opened in 1998 to provide some competition for the 
Tobacco Sales Floor on flue-cured tobacco but closed in 1999. The Zimbabwe 
Industry Tobacco Auction Centre (formerly Boka Tobacco Auction Floors) 
entered the market in 2001 with a mandated equal share in all tobacco sales. 
International marketing of tobacco leaf is conducted by multinationals. There
168 Zimbabwe first gained access to the European Commission market in 1985 with a quota 
of 8,100 tonnes under the Lome III Convention. In 1987, the quota was increased to 9,100 
tonnes under the Lome IV Convention.
Operational inefficiencies relating to unacceptable packaging, foot and mouth disease 
i7oand political factors restricted exports in 2001.
In 1994, the Tobacco Marketing Board was reconstituted to cater for the interests of all 
classes of different types of tobacco growers and buyers and indigenous buyers competed 
with traditional buyers for the first time. In 1997 the Tobacco Marketing and Levy (Amend­
ment) Act, 1997 changed the structure of the board and gave it a new name, the Tobacco 
Industry Marketing Board.
From 1983 through to 1994 Tobacco Sales Floors handled the entire Zimbabwe flue- 
cured tobacco crop.
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was concern that these companies collude to form buying cartels thus creating 
distortions in transmitting the world price to farmers. In 2001. There was a 
significant drop in tobacco planted and continued declines were expected as 
the land reform displaced large-scale farmers and the overvalued exchange 
rate reduced the profitability of tobacco for smallholders. The real net protec­
tion was estimated at 80 per cent using the parallel market rate and 66 per cent 
using the estimated real exchange rate in June 2002. This was after taking into 
account the subsidy being paid to farmers to reduce the impact of overvaluation.
Marketing of other commodities
The horticultural industry has limited government control and regulation. Ex­
port market and safety regulations are in place and a number of farmer market­
ing cooperatives are active in supplying international markets. Horticultural 
exports are dominated by the capital-intensive, large-scale sector although there 
has been a small increase in outgrower schemes incorporating smallholder farm­
ers. The main factors limiting expansion are the overvalued exchange rate which 
severely taxes all exports and the import content of the investments needed for 
sophisticated horticultural export operations. On the domestic market, farmers 
sell their crop directly to wholesalers, retail outlets, open markets and hawkers. 
The local market is supplied by exporters when produce is below standard or 
transport is unavailable and also by many small rural producers who sell mainly 
through cooperatives and the informal sector. The prices on the domestic mar­
ket are largely determined by supply and demand with the urban centres being 
the reference point for prices. Poor access to market information reduces effi­
ciency, particularly for smallholders because of the perishability of most of the 
crops. Those with aspirations to export are more affected by the currency dis­
tortions since they have limited information and lack the necessary social capi­
tal to access imports or trade on the formal currency markets.
Large-scale farmers are directly involved in marketing soyabeans, coffee, 
groundnuts, paprika, ostriches and other products either to local processing or 
trading companies, or directly on the international market. Some of these com­
modities have strict regulations and marketing restrictions in order to maintain 
standards and promote the industry. However, these restrictions can also act as 
barriers to competition and some investigation of the costs and benefits of these 
systems needs to be made. Smallholders market through traders and neigh­
bouring large farmers but unless they form marketing syndicates which can 
bulk produce, they remain at a disadvantage with their low levels of output, 
poor infrastructure and limited access to information.
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Marketing through ZIMACE
An important private sector response to the deregulation of agricultural mar­
kets was the emergence of the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange, 
known as ZIMACE. It was set up in 1994 to provide a mechanism for price 
discovery and coordination of the exchange of agricultural commodities. Zim­
babwe was one of the first countries in Africa to have a commodity exchange. 
ZIMACE started as a holding company with a single broker providing a mar­
ket for products but it expanded over the years to include buyers and end users. 
It facilitated the trade of any commodity provided or desired by any consenting 
parties except for tea, tobacco and horticultural produce. It was an exchange 
mechanism where buyers and sellers could interact, enabling the articulation 
of supply and demand conditions. Spot and forward sales took place on 
ZIMACE. The exchange provided a potentially important means for farmers, 
traders and millers to manage price risks and reduce the transaction costs of 
identifying potential buyers and/or sellers.
The volumes of commodities traded at ZIMACE increased by an average 
of 35 per cent per year between 1994 and 1999 as farmers took advantage of 
the partially liberalized agricultural marketing system. In 1995/96 and 1996/ 
97, it traded 50,000 tonnes of maize, accounting for 4 to 6 per cent of the 
national marketed maize supply from domestic production. During the 1997/ 
98 agricultural marketing year, a total of 224,531 tonnes of agricultural com­
modities were traded through the exchange compared with 107,000 tonnes in 
1996/1997. Some Z$759 million (real terms) were traded through ZIMACE 
during the period April to January 1999 compared to Z$267 million for the 
same period in 1998 (ZIMACE Trader, 1998; Muchopa, 1999; Jayne et al., 
1999).
ZIMACE was mainly used by large-scale commercial farmers and indus­
trial buyers. Membership consisted of conglomerates such as Delta, Olivine 
Industries, large-scale commercial farmers and large millers. There were a to­
tal of 17 brokers on the exchange, the Commercial Farmers’ Union being one. 
Only registered members or their employees were allowed to trade through 
ZIMACE. Of the members, 75 per cent were broking members and 25 per cent 
were non-broking members. ZIMACE’s prices were used as reference prices 
in negotiating forward contracts with farmers and larger traders within ZIMACE 
and by traders and fanners negotiating sales outside. Its greatest contribution 
to agricultural marketing in Zimbabwe was to act as a completely transparent 
instrument of price discovery for agricultural producers. A significant develop-
172Broking members exclusively dealt in the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange 
whilst non-broking members could buy and sell elsewhere. However, non-broking mem­
bers could not make contacts directly through the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity 
Exchange, they had to find a broking member who made a contract for them.
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ment was that smallholders were basing the prices of their commodities on the 
exchange’s prices, putting them in a better bargaining position as they looked 
for markets for their produce (Muchopa, 1999).
In July 2001 a Statutory Instrument 235A of 2001 was introduced declar­
ing maize, maize products, wheat and wheat products controlled products within 
Zimbabwe. This made it illegal to buy, sell or move these products within Zim­
babwe other than to the Grain Marketing Board. In the light of these develop­
ments, trade at ZIMACE was officially suspended (ZIMACE, 2001).
Conclusion
The state-controlled agricultural marketing system of the pre-independence era 
played an important role in commercializing the production of major com­
modities. However the system discriminated against smallholders. The expan­
sion of this system to smallholders after independence created a serious fiscal 
burden but it had a positive impact on smallholder producers in remote regions 
who did not have a comparative advantage in maize production. In general, 
however, the price and marketing policies impacted negatively on both growth 
and equity.
The liberalization of the market system in the 1990s generated some posi­
tive effects for many farmers, rural traders and urban consumers and played a 
role in reducing parastatal debts. However, some of the privatized boards re­
tained effective monopolies which limited the benefits to producers and con­
sumers. The liberalization of the grain market assisted the smallholder sector 
and traders, and contributed to rural industrialization.
The reintroduction of controls on maize marketing was a drawback to the 
gains from the economic structural adjustment programme. The return to maize 
and wheat marketing monopoly and price controls was a source of great con­
cern to farmers, consumers and traders. This move saw a retrogressive devel­
opment in the domestic market at a time when newly resettled fanners required 
a clear articulation of marketing and pricing incentives to stimulate food pro­
duction and arrest the decline in per capita national food production experi­
enced after 2000. Agricultural marketing could be improved by the following:
• Encouraging rural development and expanding local markets and opportu­
nities for traders;
• Improving agricultural growth by reducing marketing margins and barriers 
to entry, increasing competition and improving infrastructure and commu­
nication;
• Improving equity (and reducing price instability) by ensuring that the Grain 
Marketing Board can fulfil its role as buyer and seller of last resort; and
• Improving national food security by establishing secure financial and stock 
reserves for basic staples.
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The state marketing monopolies were disbanded as a result of the structural 
adjustment programme but they have been converted into private monopolies. 
Therefore the state needs to foster competition and remove barriers to entry. 
The state needs to play a much more active role in improving infrastructure, 
making information widely accessible and encouraging more traders and proc­
essors to operate in the rural areas. Access to finance, foreign currency and 
processing and transport inputs is necessary to assist small processors and trad­
ers. There has been an increase in Chinese and Indian imports of equipment 
appropriate to small processors and these efforts need to be encouraged through 
access to foreign currency and low tariffs. The overvalued exchange rate and 
limited access to foreign currency for imports is a serious disruption to this 
development.
The role of the Grain Marketing Board in providing floor and ceiling prices 
could reduce the risks faced by poor farmers and poor consumers but for the 
board to be effective, it needs to sell stocks early when there are shortages and 
buy stocks early in good surplus years. In the long run, it may be more effective 
to encourage localized storage and exchange systems to achieve rural food 
security and ensure that the multiplier effects of maize processing and trading 
remain in the rural areas.
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